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INTRODUCTION 
Iraq’s indigenous Assyrians1 are facing cleansing from Iraq if the 
U.S. Government continues to ignore the crisis and does not take 
action immediately. The Assyrians celebrated their 6,758th New 
Year in April of this year and directly connect their land to its 
Mesopotamian roots with their continued physical presence. They 
remain the last composite group of people who speak Aramaic, the 
language of Christ, as their primary language. The great majority of 
them still reside in close proximity to the ancient capital city of 
Nineveh—located in northern Iraq. As Christians, Assyrians belong 
to various denominations, most notably Chaldean, Syrian Orthodox 
and Church of the East. However, they also belong to various 
Protestant churches and denominations. 
The current crisis facing Iraq’s Christian Assyrians is 
downplayed at best and dismissed at worst by the U.S. 
Government, blinding it to the pragmatic, feasible policy 
solutions that it can implement with immediate positive impact. 
The United States must understand that Assyrian Christians are 
disproportionately represented in Iraq’s professional and 
educated elite. They are a significant component of the American 
administrative structure in Iraq. This depletion of Iraq’s human 
capital will have devastating effects throughout the country, 
decreasing Iraq’s capacity to stand up, which would allow the 
United States to stand down. 
By the late 1980s, there were approximately 1.4 million 
Christians in Iraq, the vast majority of which would be 
Assyrians.2 Leading up to Iraq’s liberation from Saddam 
 1. They are also known as Chaldean or Syriac. See generally Peter BetBasoo, 
Brief History of Assyrians, http://www.aina.org/aol/peter/brief.htm (describing the 
history of the Assyrians and their development of the region that includes present 
day Iraq); Religious and Ethnic Groups in Kirkuk, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 2008, at 
2A (defining Assyrian Christians as “a small and distinct ethnic minority tracing its 
origins to the Assyrian empire” who consist of three percent of the national 
population and generally live in northern Iraq). 
 2. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, IRAQ: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – 2004 sec. 2.c 
(2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41722.htm (describing the forced 
relocation of non-Arabs during the 1980s and 1990s). The Christian population in 
Iraq included roughly 30,000 Armenian Christians. Id. 
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Hussein, that figure declined to approximately 1 million.3 From 
liberation in 2003 to the present, over 350,000 Iraqi Christians 
have fled (at least one-third of the Iraqi Christian population). 
This rate of attrition will soon empty the country of its 
indigenous Assyrian Christian population.4
An even greater percentage of Iraqi Christians have become 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) dislocated within the 
country. Many of these people are returning to their lands in the 
Nineveh Plain and to other areas of northern Iraq.5 Their 
numbers are poorly documented. In September 2006, Assyrian 
NGOs lost track of the number of IDPs in the Nineveh Plain 
when the amount exceeded 10,000 families—a massive 
absorption rate for the area.6
 3. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, IRAQ: INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005 sec. 1 (2005), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51600.htm [hereinafter IRAQ RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM REPORT]. 
 4. The UNHCR refugee and IDP situation report for July 2007 indicates that 
Christians constitute fifteen percent and twenty percent of refugees in Jordan and 
Syria respectively. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
STATISTICS OF DISPLACED IRAQIS AROUND THE WORLD 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=47 
0387fc2. Based on refugee numbers and conservative U.S. Department of State 
data that Christians constituted roughly 1 million of Iraq’s population, a 
conservative estimate would be that there are upwards of 300,000 ChaldoAssyrian 
Christian refugees. See IRAQ RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 3, sec. 1. 
This confirms the data of various NGOs working closely on the refugee issue that 
the refugee crisis within Iraq and in the surrounding neighbors is reaching dire 
levels; see, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAQ – RHETORIC AND REALITY: THE 
IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
library/asset/MDE14/011/2008/en/43d61ea9-3637-11dd-9db5-cb00b5aed8dc/mdel 
40112008eng.pdf (documenting the number of displaced Iraqis since 2003 and 
concluding that the numbers are at their highest levels ever). 
 5. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE, IRAQ: A DISPLACEMENT 
CRISIS: A PROFILE OF THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT SITUATION 53 (2007), 
available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfo 
Files)/129E903BAA2C8245C12572AE002EE88A/$file/Iraq+-March+2007.pdf 
(describing the desire of many Christians to flee to northern areas of Iraq after 
suffering acts of violence, including the burning of Christian churches). 
 6. See IRAQ SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY PROJECT, ISDP BRIEFING ON 
NINEVEH PLAIN IDP NEEDS: THE CURRENT CRISIS AND POLICY SOLUTIONS 1 
(2008) (forthcoming report on file with author) [hereinafter ISDP BRIEFING ON 
NINEVEH PLAIN]. The Nineveh Plains-based Nineveh Center for Research and 
Development, along with the Assyrian Aid Society, conducted a survey in late 
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Preventing the successful ethno-religious cleansing of Iraq’s 
indigenous Assyrians is a self-evident humanitarian priority. 
However, it also serves the long-term goal of giving Iraq a better 
chance at establishing a sustainable democracy. The Mandaean-
Sabaean community is largely cleansed, with only 750 families 
remaining from a population of roughly 60,000 in 2003. Assyrians, 
and the other vulnerable minorities who will follow in their footsteps 
(Shabaks, Yezidis, and Turkmen, among others), are necessary to 
keeping Iraq ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, an essential 
ingredient for democratization. 
The cleansing of the Mandaean-Sabaean people, a people of 
antiquity, reflects the very real threat of annihilation facing all the 
defenseless minorities. 
I. THE ASSYRIAN CRISIS IN IRAQ AND U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST 
Some months ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated 
that past U.S. policy in the Middle East meant, “we [the United 
States] supported authoritarian regimes, and they supported our 
shared interest in regional stability.”7 She acknowledges the error 
made in pursuing the type of “stability” created by supporting 
authoritarian governments, stating that “[f]or 60 years . . . the United 
States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region 
here in the Middle East—and we achieved neither.”8
The deliberate targeting of minorities by Islamist extremists, 
including the government-affiliated Sadr Militia and Badr Brigade, 
and by prejudicial policies from the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG), is emptying Iraq of its indigenous Assyrians. This situation, 
the U.S. Government’s approach to this crisis, and the Bush 
2006 and early 2007 which enumerated 9,987 IDP families in the Nineveh Plain. 
Seventy percent were Assyrian Christians. Id. This figure, however, is only a rough 
estimate, as many IDP families refuse to register for fear of being tracked by 
insurgents and extremists. NGOs and research bodies on the ground estimate the 
number to be more than three times greater. 
 7. Condoleezza Rice, Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for 
a New World, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2008, at 2, 13 [hereinafter Rice, 
Rethinking the National Interest]. 
 8. Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the American University in 
Cairo (June 20, 2005), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm. 
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Administration’s policies on this ethno-religious cleansing indicates 
very little progress with respect to Secretary Rice’s assertion that a 
new policy course in the Middle East is being forged. 
A fuller examination of the Assyrian situation in Iraq (including a 
specific examination of the KRG9) is necessary to put into 
perspective that little seems to have changed in the U.S. 
Government’s approaches to “stability” and “national security.” The 
purpose, however, is to highlight what needs to be done and outline 
the policies that can allow the U.S. Government to say it has changed 
its course and is genuinely charting a new direction in the Middle 
East pursuant to its national interests as outlined by the Secretary of 
State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The intentions, thoughts, and 
arguments put forth in this Article are intended to support the U.S. 
Government in securing its national interest and to tangibly 
demonstrate its steadfastness to the “new realism” articulated by 
Secretary Rice. This will not only help fulfill U.S. goals, but will also 
serve the interests of protecting Iraq’s defenseless minorities, 
particularly the Assyrian Christians, against the existential threat 
they face today. 
 9. There are debates about the culpability of the central government in 
Baghdad regarding the targeting and persecution of ethno-religious minorities. The 
basis of this debate is the inability of the central government to develop and 
implement policy, and therefore minority persecution is not government-driven. 
This is debatable in terms of assessing central government apathy or the political 
affiliations of the major militias. However, the KRG is highly effective at 
developing and implementing policy and therefore carries a significant degree of 
responsibility for its persecution of minorities. See also Bush Renews Support for 
Iraqi Government, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=13861513 (contrasting the White House’s 
support of Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki with the growing U.S. criticism of the 
Iraqi government and providing an overview of the debate). Compare Daniel 
Smith, Repairing a Broken Iraq, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, July 3, 2006, 
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3339 (criticizing the Iraqi government for its failure to 
take responsibility for many of the internal problems faced after the invasion and 
for policies, such as offering amnesty to participants in the rebellion, that 
undermined U.S. efforts), with Qassim Abdul-Zahra, Jordan’s King Visits Iraq, 
Urges Arabs to Support, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.huffington 
post.com/2008/08/11/jordans-king-visits-iraq_n_118284.html (describing Jordan’s 
King Abdullah II’s praise of the Iraqi government and his work to build Middle-
Eastern support for the Iraqi government).  
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II. THE SITUATION/CRISIS 
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has documented 
that Christian Assyrians are often the victims of targeted violent 
acts, and many are being forced to flee Iraq.10 Despite being a 
small minority in the general Iraqi population, Christians make 
up roughly twenty percent of all Iraqi refugees.11
The Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project (ISDP) conducted a 
field mission to the region in March and April 2007 and asked 
the Christian refugees what drove them out of Iraq.12 The 
responses from refugees were alarmingly consistent when 
expressing their greatest fears and rehashing their experiences. 
Refugees overwhelmingly asserted that persecution by extremists 
arose because they are perceived as co-religionists and 
collaborators with the Americans. Many of those interviewed 
underlined the reality of Arab, Kurdish and Islamist militias who 
are fully aware that Assyrian Christians have no means of 
retaliation in the face of attacks—lacking any deterrent capacity 
or source of protection. They often mentioned their lack of any 
meaningful control of political institutions, insisting that the 
motives for attacks cannot be from control of any ‘political turf’; 
meaning attacks are happening purely out of malice. Refugees 
repeatedly mentioned daily reminders of their religious 
 10. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION OF NON-MUSLIM RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAQ 
4 (2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain? 
docid=4371cf5b4 [hereinafter UNHCR BACKGROUND ON RELIGIOUS MINORITIES] 
(noting that, for example, in one refugee camp in Syria, thirty-six percent of 
refugees were Christians). 
 11. See id. (noting thirty-six percent of Iraqi refugees in a Syrian refugee camp 
are Christian), Frances Harrison, Christians Besieged in Iraq, BBC NEWS, Mar. 13, 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7295145.stm (reporting that 
Christians are “massively over-represented” in the Iraqi refugee population); see 
also Nonna Gorilovskaya, Christians Leaving Iraq, MOTHER JONES, Aug. 3, 2004, 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/dailymojo/2004/08/ 08_503.html (contrasting 
the massive amount of Christian refugees with the proportion of Christians in the 
general population and noting that Christians only comprise about three percent of 
the Iraqi population). 
 12. See IRAQ SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, VOTING WITH THEIR 
FEET: UNDERSTANDING THE ASSYRIAN/CHALDEAN/SYRIAC EXODUS FROM IRAQ 2 
(May 2007), available at http://www.iraqdemocracyproject.org/pdf/IDP-policy 
%20brief.pdf [hereinafter ISDP, VOTING WITH THEIR FEET]. 
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persecution, speaking of reminders brought to their doors—even 
delivered with bullets and blood—stating that Iraq is not for 
Christians any longer. Most of the refugees tried to go north, to the 
Nineveh Plain or the Kurdistan region in Iraq. Refugees were unable 
to secure jobs unless willing to join the Kurdistan Democratic Party. 
For many who first became internally-displaced by fleeing to the 
north, land return was a major denial of their basic rights. Many 
ultimately became refugees because Kurds had seized their lands and 
the Kurdistan Regional Government would not implement any 
decisions requiring the return of land to original Assyrian 
inhabitants.13
A. THE SITUATION IN IRAQ 
“Death to U.S. Agents” is the standard Al-Qaeda message that 
particularly targets Christian Assyrians. They are seen as co-
religionists and collaborators with the United States. Their past 
and continued support for the liberation of Iraq is undeniable. 
They could not have foreseen complete abandonment by the U.S. 
Government given the extent of the existential threat they are 
facing.14 The disillusionment expressed by Assyrian refugees 
interviewed in March and April 2007 centered on their 
perception of complete U.S. Government disregard for their 
security. 
In mid 2006, Al-Qaeda and others began a focused program of 
cleansing Assyrian Christians from Dora (a district with over 
20,000 Assyrian homes in 2003).15 The Christians were given the 
following options: convert to Islam, and to demonstrate 
commitment, assist in targeting other Christians; not only pay the 
 13. See id. These comments represent a synthesis of the types of comments 
made by Assyrian refugee families interviewed by IDSP over two weeks across 
Amman, Damascus, and Beirut. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See IRAQ SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY PROJECT, CREATING A NINEVEH 
PLAIN LOCAL POLICE FORCE: OVERCOMING ETHNO-RELIGIOUS MINORITY 
INSECURITY 4 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.iraqdemocracyproject.org/pdf 
/Minority%20Policing%20-%20policy%20brief.pdf [hereinafter ISDP, NINEVEH 
LOCAL POLICE]; Keith Roderick, Iraq’s Christian Exodus, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, 
July 30, 2007, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NjFIZTIyYjZjYjk1NmZhZT 
c2MmUxNzJjZmI4ZTI0MWI=. 
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jizya (non-Muslim tax), but pay tens and hundreds of thousands 
extra, on demand, to fund the insurgency; send a daughter or 
sister to the local Mosque to be married to a Muslim; leave; or 
die.16
The Dora neighborhood now has less than 1,000 homes left, 
but these are termed “partial/broken” homes.17 The men of 
fighting strength who can somewhat defend themselves have sent 
away the children, women, and elderly. Al-Qaeda has moved in 
and effectively decimated the community. Every family has been 
threatened with kidnappings, murders, and torture through 
letters. Phone calls and visits to places of work (especially 
shops) are favored means of intimidation in person by Islamists 
and insurgents.18
Threats are for the lucky ones; most are kidnapped, or have 
members of their family kidnapped.19 Kidnappings often end in 
tragedy, as discovered in the interviews. These cold-blooded 
murders spur immediate flight, although many of those released 
after a ransom is paid also opt to run, fearing recapture. In 
numerous cases, botched kidnap attempts simply result in the 
shooting death of the intended victim. Kidnappers ratcheted up 
the pressure by torturing kidnapped children while negotiations 
with parents take place. 
Targeting churches and religious figures is also so pervasive 
as to send a broad signal to all Iraqi Christians. The bombings 
and attacks on over forty churches, the regular kidnapping of 
priests, and gruesome murdering of priests, set in motion total 
panic and flight by this vulnerable minority.20 Several types of 
attacks cause extraordinary fear and place immense pressure on 
 16. ISDP, NINEVEH LOCAL POLICE, supra note 15, at 4; see also Roderick, 
supra note 15; Doug Bandow, Thrown to the Lions, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, 
July 2, 2007, http://spectator.org/archives/2007/07/02/thrown-to-the-lions/print. 
 17. See ISDP, NINEVEH LOCAL POLICE, supra note 15, at 4. 
 18. See id. at 5 (describing the numerous types of threats posed to Christians by 
Iraqi insurgents). 
 19. See Bandow, supra note 16. 
 20. See id. See generally PETER BETBASOO, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY, 
INCIPIENT GENOCIDE: THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ (2007), 
available at http://www.aina.org/reports/ig.pdf (providing a detailed explanation of 
the persecution of Christian Assyrians in Iraq). 
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the community. One particularly gruesome example occurred 
when a priest was beheaded and dismembered and returned to his 
parish with a note directing the parishioners to post notices 
apologizing for His Holiness, Pope Benedict XVI’s remarks 
offending Islam on the church.21
Flight from Basra, Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk is an act of 
total desperation, the main goal being to stay alive. The travel 
involves the arrangement of a taxi, carrying only what fits into 
pockets, bags, and items placed on laps. It is the total 
abandonment of all else they have built up.22 This immediate, 
desparate situation produces large numbers of IDPs, and ones 
that are entirely impoverished and vulnerable from the onset. 
As noted above in the insights of Christian refugees, the 
Assyrians have no ability to deter attacks because they are not 
able to become an effective part of the policing services in Iraq. 
They are not even able to establish formal, legitimate, 
representative policing forces in areas where they predominate, 
such as the Nineveh Plain. In late 2005 and mid 2006, local 
representatives made two efforts at securing a representative 
police force for the Nineveh Plain.23 The first effort consisted of 
1,000 members, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Deputy 
Governor in Mosul undermined it politically by refusing to 
accept the formation of such a force and deriding the idea as the 
formation of a Christian militia. The second effort involved 700 
Christian Assyrians who were ultimately sent for training, but 
quickly abandoned the endeavor when they were threatened to be 
deployed to a Sunni insurgent stronghold in Mosul, and not the 
intended area of the Nineveh Plain. With respect to Baghdad-
controlled Iraq, U.S. soldiers report incidents where Catholic 
officers training cadets are stoned to death when Muslim cadets 
learn of their religion.24
 21. See Nina Shea, Death Comes for the Archbishop, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, 
Mar. 14, 2008, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZDZhN2FmODg5NjczM 
2I1MWJIMjk2M2E4ZGQwZmZIMTY= (reporting the beheading of Catholic 
Archbishop Paulos Faraj Rahho in Mosul). 
 22. See ISDP, VOTING WITH THEIR FEET, supra note 12. 
 23. See ISDP, NINEVEH LOCAL POLICE, supra note 15, at 7-8. 
 24. George F. Will, An Iraq Caucus of One, WASH. POST, June 17, 2007, at 
B07 (“[Senator] Gordon Smith, the Oregon Republican, had lunch with three 
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B. NEW DEVELOPMENTS – CURRENT ATTACKS 
In August 2008, the KDP-dominated Ninawa Provincial Council 
tried removing the still-developing legitimate, formal police force in 
the Nineveh Plain, securing an order from the Ministry of the Interior 
to do so.25 The following month of September saw the minorities’ 
quota legislation for securing thirteen reserved seats across several 
governorate councils stripped from the electoral law on governorates. 
In October 2008, a brutal campaign of targeted, highly visible 
murders of Assyrian Christians over a period of three weeks 
commenced in Mosul. Vehicles regularly drove through Assyrian 
neighborhoods threatening all Christians with death for remaining in 
the city. Mosul is the last remaining urban area of population 
concentration for the Assyrians since the largely successful cleansing 
campaigns in Basra and Baghdad. These past three months reflect a 
systematic process of neutralizing a modest security force, removal 
of rights to political representation, followed by direct physical 
attacks spurning the flight of over 3,000 families into the Nineveh 
Plain. 
Christmas in 2007 was relatively peaceful, allowing many to hope 
that a corner had been turned in the targeting of Assyrian 
Christians.26 Regrettably, most observers overlooked the fact that 
Christmas overlapped with a major Muslim religious celebration.27 
Once the Mujahideen and insurgents concluded their holiday, they 
unleashed a wave of high-level attacks. In January 2008, six 
churches, two nunneries and an orphanage managed by nuns were 
bombed or attacked.28
soldiers from his state, one of whom had been working with an Iraqi officer 
training police cadets. That soldier told Smith that when the cadets learned 
that the Iraqi officer was Catholic, they stoned him. To death.”). 
 25. See IRAQ SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY PROJECT, IRAQ’S NINAWA 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IS REMOVING NINEVEH PLAIN LOCAL POLICE FORCE 
(2008) (forthcoming report on file with author). 
 26. E.g., Kimi Yoshino & Usama Redha, Few Left to Mark Iraqi Christmas, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at A-11 (describing the tepid optimism for Iraqi 
Christians on the eve of Christmas 2007). 
 27. See generally At Least Seven Churches Were Bombed in Iraq, ASSYRIAN 
INT’L NEWS AGENCY, http://www.aina.org/news/20080106153742.htm (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2008). 
 28. See generally Church Bombings in Iraq Since 2004, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS 
AGENCY, http://www.aina.org/news/20080107163014.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 
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In February, the Archbishop of Mosul was kidnapped, and in 
March his body was recovered.29 In April, another priest in Baghdad 
was killed in a highly public manner.30 All this is in addition to the 
daily, constant targeting of the general Assyrian population. This is 
meant to send a message. It indicates to Assyrian Christians that 
while Iraq overall may stabilize, their lives will not get better. If the 
U.S. and Iraqi Governments continue to downplay or deny the 
reality, the insurgents may prove to be right. 
C. THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ  
AND KRG-CONTROLLED AREAS 
The situation in northern Iraq and KRG-controlled areas 
(where the government has formal jurisdiction and where it is 
seeking to dominate) can be likened to a return of Saddam-era 
authoritarianism. The community has long felt the pressure and 
intimidation of the Peshmerga, particularly from the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP). Peshmerga, however, are an extension 
of their political leaders in the KDP, and the problem is 
political.31
The formative experience in post-liberation Iraq for Christian 
Assyrians was the deliberate disenfranchisement of their people, 
particularly in the Nineveh Plain that occurred in the January and 
December 2005 elections (more effectively in January), and 
during the October referendum. It was a simple yet powerful 
message: you have no right to decide your future—the KDP will 
 
2008) (reporting nine attacks in early January, 2008). 
 29. See BETBASSO, supra note 20; Shea, supra note 21. 
 30. See Ernesto Londoño, Assyrian Orthodox Priest Fatally Shot in Baghdad, 
Alarming Christians, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2008, at A20. 
 31. See Fact File: Kurdish Fighters, BBC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2940053.stm (defining Peshmerga as 
Kurdish fighters in Northern Iraq who are loyal to either the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan); Country Briefings: Iraq – Political 
Forces, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2007, https://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq/ 
profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Political%20Forces (reporting that the Kurds, through 
the KDP and other political parties, control 25,000 Peshmerga guerrilla fighters). 
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decide.32 The Department of State’s 2005 Human Rights Country 
Report for Iraq bluntly indicates: 
In the January elections, many of the mostly non-Muslim 
residents on the Nineveh Plain were unable to vote. Some 
polling places did not open, ballot boxes were not 
delivered, and incidents of voter fraud and intimidation 
occurred. These problems resulted from administrative 
breakdowns on voting day and the refusal of Kurdish 
security forces to allow ballot boxes to pass to 
predominantly Christian villages.33
Unable to realize their electoral potential, Assyrians have seen 
the suffocation and atrophying of their legitimate, local political 
groups—some of whom were declared allies by the President of 
the United States. For example, the Assyrian Democratic 
Movement is recognized as an ally and included in the Iraq 
Liberation Act.34
Concurrently, the civil society networks and relief 
organizations that are independent of the KDP have also 
witnessed the same rapid deterioration as the KDP prevents any 
resources from reaching them so they may help the needy. 
Instead, the modest amount of aid that does reach Christian 
Assyrians comes with extraordinary political conditionalities. 
 32. See Gareth Porter, Voting Shenanigans Cloud Key Province, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 28, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?id 
news=30451 (describing the intense standoff that occurred when U.S. troops, 
charged with delivering ballots to polling places in the Nineveh Plain, encountered 
Kurdish resistance); Gareth Porter, Vote Figures for Crucial Province Don’t Add 
Up, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 19, 2005, 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30692 (raising questions regarding the 
validity of the Nineveh vote). 
 33. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, IRAQ: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – 2005 § 3 
(2006), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61689.htm (describing voting 
“irregularities” and problems that occurred during the 2005 elections, including 
incidents of Kurdish forces’ preventing ballot boxes to pass to Christian 
communities). 
 34. Presidential Determination No. 2003-05, 67 Fed. Reg. 78, 121 (Dec. 23, 
2002) (declaring the Assyrian Democratic Movement a “democratic opposition 
organization” eligible to receive assistance under Section 4 of the Iraq Liberation 
Act of 1998). 
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Membership and demonstrable support for the KDP is the 
primary requirement. Rejection of any independent positions 
outside of the KDP is demanded.35
The situation in northern Iraq is tangibly that of a new 
apartheid-like development track for Christian Assyrians as they 
widely choose not to succumb to KDP authoritarianism. 
However, it appears that U.S. Government neglect of this 
community in terms of equitable reconstruction and development 
is aiding their starvation into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. By 
all accounts, the U.S. Government’s disregard for the 
development needs of Christian Assyrians in light of the scale of 
their dislocation causes them to fall prey to the predatory 
behavior of the KDP.36
Disenfranchisement and apartheid-like development as 
policies implemented by the KDP are matched by summary 
arrests, detentions, physical abuse, killings with impunity, and 
most importantly, illegal land/property seizures. As reported by 
so many refugees, most would like to return to the lands and 
villages from which they were Arabized by the Ba’ath in 
northern Iraq, primarily in the Nineveh Plain, throughout Dohuk 
and Irbil governorates.37 Kurds, either directly connected to the 
KDP (sometimes at senior-most levels) or simply backed by the 
KDP, have illegally seized or stolen substantial amounts of 
village and farming lands belonging to Assyrians.38
 35. See Anthony Shadid & Steve Fairnau, Militias on Rise Across Iraq: Shiite 
and Kurdish Groups Seizing Control, Instilling Fear in North and South, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 21, 2005, at A1 (emphasizing the willingness of the KRG Peshmerga 
to use force against Assyrian-Iraqi officials that take political positions 
independent of the KRG). 
 36. See Kenneth Timmerman, Christians Face Extinction in Northern Iraq, 
NEWSMAX.COM, April 24, 2008, http://www.newsmax.com/timmerman/christians_ 
mosul_iraq/2008/04/24/90555.html (describing how the relative deprivation of the 
Nineveh Plain and despair is being alleviated by aid from the KRG, but that such 
aid comes with political conditionalities, including the goal of annexing the region 
to the KRG). 
 37. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE, supra note 5, at 21, 78-79 
(describing the Arabization campaign of the 1970s in which the Ba’ath party 
evicted Kurdish farmers in the north and replaced them with poor Arab tribal 
members from the south and tracing the campaign’s work and impact from the 
1970s, through the 1990s, and into the wake of the U.S. invasion). 
 38. Id. at 78-79. 
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Whereas the KRG has sought to aggressively reverse 
Arabization policies that impacted Kurdish villages, they have 
stonewalled the resolution of Assyrian land return and been 
complicit or actively involved in Kurdish illegal expropriation of 
Assyrian Christian lands. The KDP publicizes that tens of 
thousands of Assyrian Christian families are coming to the safety 
of the north, but hundreds of thousands are leaving the country 
entirely.39 This reality is directly connected to the problems of 
illegal land seizures. In effect, they are locking the Ba’athist 
Arabization program into place, but against non-Kurdish 
minorities. This has two primary effects: first, it prevents 
thousands of Assyrian families from returning to their lands; and 
second, it compels a great number of them to live in urban 
centers if they choose not to leave the region. For the Assyrian 
minority, this generates natural pressure for assimilation akin to 
that created by Saddam Hussein. Kurdification appears to be the 
desired outcome, or at least the thinning-out of the indigenous 
Assyrian Christians. 
1. A Personal Story of Tragedy 
ISDP learned of Sargon Hanna’s case through a field mission 
conducted in March 2007.40 His family and relatives, all refugees, 
were present for the interview. Sargon is missing a leg resulting from 
a bomb attack on a church in Baghdad during services on September 
24, 2006.41 He was guarding the church when the bomb detonated. 
When Sargon’s son Ashur asked of him to leave their homeland, now 
having buried one leg in it, Sargon responded that “terrorists could 
take his other leg and he still would not leave.”42 Rather than taking 
his other leg, however, terrorists kidnapped the very same son. 
 39. Compare Christians in Mosul, Either to Migrate or Pay Attribute, 
PEYAMNER NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.peyamner.com/default. 
aspx?I=4&id=48805 (describing, in a Kurdish news publication, the “wave of 
Christians” migrating to Kurdistan as a result of the violence in major Iraqi cities), 
with UNHCR BACKGROUND ON RELIGIOUS MINORITIES, supra note 10, at 2-4 
(documenting the Christian exodus from Iraq). 
 40. Names have been changed to protect individuals. 
 41. See Roderick, supra note 15. 
 42. See ISDP, VOTING WITH THEIR FEET, supra note 12. 
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Sargon was given the following options by his son’s kidnappers: 
become a suicide bomber; become a devout Muslim; or pay 
$200,000 USD. Terrorists told Sargon to “ask George Bush to send 
you the money.”43 Sargon’s son, who also worked to provide security 
for a British company, endured systematic torture in captivity (which 
included electrocution and the pouring of boiling water on his skin, 
among other horrors). Seeing their demands rejected, the terrorists 
tried executing Ashur by firing a bullet through his spine. He was 
then thrown out onto the streets. Miraculously, he survived and was 
taken to a hospital in Baghdad, paralyzed. It was a brazen attempt by 
someone in police uniform to execute Ashur in the hospital that 
forced the family to flee Baghdad for Dohuk, in northern Iraq. 
Currently, his relatives are being denied the right to reclaim the 
lands they were driven off of by Saddam Hussein.44 Their lands are 
today seized by Kurds. Sargon’s cousin Naramsin describes: 
[Kurds] took our land, in our village. They said ‘over their 
blood’ they won’t give back the land. We appealed to the 
Governor; he would do nothing about it. What rights do we 
have? . . . So much of our lands are being taken by Kurds; the 
government does nothing. Many of our people in Baghdad 
cannot return to their lands in northern Iraq because Kurds 
are sitting on their lands.45
The economic impact of land theft in the KRG on ethno-religious 
minorities such as Assyrians is severe, contributing to Sargon’s 
decision to abandon hope and become a refugee in Syria with his 
entire family. His son, Ashur, now lies paralyzed in a bed, where he 
is somewhat better cared for, but still unable to return to his 
homeland. Sargon informed ISDP that greater freedom and 
assurances of human rights and equality are also essential for the 
Assyrians, especially IDPs, in northern Iraq. Sargon’s refugee 
neighbor Ishaya stated bluntly, “We are not Kurdish, so if we are not 
with the [Kurdistan Democratic Party], we will not reach anything; 
 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Interview with Naramsin in Damascus, Syria (Mar. 19, 2007). 
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we are second class. If I am not with the party, how can I get real 
work? I cannot fight and argue; I am not Kurdish.”46
D. SARGON’S STORY IN PERSPECTIVE 
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) best 
described, albeit implicitly, the territorial issues between 
indigenous Assyrians and Kurds in its recent Dohuk Governorate 
IDP Needs Assessment.47 Assyrian Christians make up eighty-
five percent of IDPs (10,969 IDP families of the total 12,905).48 
UNHCR explains this dramatically high number: “Dahuk is 
historically home to more Christian villages than the two other 
Governorates and also experienced a displacement of Christians 
during the Ba’ath regime. Consequently, Christians in Dahuk are 
predominately a returning Diaspora staying with relatives and 
friends.”49 The tens of thousands of Christians fleeing to the 
north must be seen in light of the hundreds of thousands fleeing 
the country. It is this fact that compels a determined policy to 
secure this population in Iraq. 
1. Historical Perspective on Displacement – Simele to the Present 
In 1933, the Government of Iraq massacred over 3,000 Assyrians 
in the Simele district.50 This massacre is indeed “Iraq’s First 
 46. Interview with Ishaya in Damascus, Syria (Mar. 19, 2007). 
 47. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, RAPID NEEDS 
ASSESSMENT OF RECENTLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE KURDISTAN REGION 3-4 
(2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf? 
tbl=SUBSITES&id=45db09052 [hereinafter UNHCR, RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT] 
(noting that many of the displaced Christians in the north also experienced 
displacement during the Ba’ath regime and that the ruling Kurdistan parties are not 
providing assistance to the Christian IDPs). 
 48. Id. at 3. 
 49. Id. (noting further that of the remaining IDPs, ten percent are Kurds, and 
five percent “are Arabs, the majority of whom have fled sectarian violence in 
Baghdad”). 
 50. INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & ALLIANCE INTERNATIONALE POUR LA 
JUSTICE, IRAQ: CONTINUOUS AND SILENT ETHNIC CLEANSING—DISPLACED 
PERSONS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN AND IRAQI REFUGEES IN IRAN 17 (2003), available 
at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/iq350a.pdf (characterizing the massacre as 
“punishment” for Assyrians’ asserting their rights and demanding equal treatment). 
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Halabja.”51 It is also why the atrocities perpetrated by later regimes 
were seen as nothing new, but indeed a tool used since the creation 
of Iraq to persecute and control minority populations. This slaughter 
was motivated by a belief that the Assyrian Christians were an 
irredentist, armed threat to Iraq’s national security.52
The reverberations of the 1933 Simele massacre are still felt today 
because of the decimation of the population physically and the mass 
flight it generated. Those lands are now largely void of the original 
inhabitants because of that genocidal attack and the ethnic cleansing 
that followed. Then the wiping out of villages through the 1960s to 
the 1980s in Arabization programs compounded the mass dislocation 
of the Assyrian Christians from their lands.53 This should make clear 
why UNHCR is identifying those IDPs returning to areas such as 
Dohuk as a “returning Diaspora;” they are either those originally 
driven out or the descendents of those cleansed from ancestral 
lands.54 Confirmation of this reality arose through studies by the 
Nineveh Center for Research and Development (NCRD). As part of 
NCRD’s survey work, IDPs indicated whether they had family in the 
Nineveh Plain—over eighty percent of respondents said yes.55
Today’s level of refugee flight—about one in three Christians are 
now out of Iraq and even more are internally displaced—is part of a 
 51. On March 16, 1988, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons on the 
Kurdish town of Halabja in Northern Iraq, ultimately killing over 5,000 civilians. 
See U.S. Department of State, Saddam’s Chemical Weapons Campaign: Halabja, 
March 16, 1988, Mar. 14, 2003, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/18714.htm; Elaine 
Sciolino, Kurdish Chief Gains Support in U.S. Visit, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1988, 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE1DF1E3FF93 
1A15755C0A96E948260 (reporting the U.S. visit of Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani 
and his accounts of the atrocities at Halabja). 
 52. See IRAQ SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY PROJECT, CULTURAL RIGHTS AND 
DEMOCRACY: IRAQI ASSYRIANS A CASE STUDY FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
3 (2006), http://www.iraqdemocracyproject.org/pdf/CulturalGenocideofAssyrians 
inIraq.pdf [hereinafter ISDP, CULTURAL RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY] (describing the 
Iraqi outlook on the Simele Massacre as “an exercise of sovereignty and nation-
building”); INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 49 (describing the 
impetus of the Simele Massacre to be retribution for their assertion of a national 
identity). 
 53. The Assyrian Academic Society has identified at least 183 ChaldoAssyrian 
Villages that were destroyed by the Ba’athists, who also deported the residents. See 
ISDP, CULTURAL RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 52, at app. A. 
 54. See UNHCR, RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 47, at 2. 
 55. See ISDP BRIEFING ON NINEVEH PLAIN, supra note 6. 
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population shift spurned by persecution and deliberate targeting and 
continues today.56 The return to the north, and particularly the 
Nineveh Plain, is a vital opportunity as part of a sad but necessary 
return of a Diaspora, which offers the primary chance of an enduring 
solution. These people are voting with their feet in returning to these 
lands, if they do not opt to leave Iraq entirely.57
IV. U.S. POLICY AND U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS 
REVISITED 
It is in this context that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s 
words must be understood and assessed. When she indicates that the 
past errors of approaches to the Middle East are at an end, that 
American policy has a new modus operandi, and that the priority is 
no longer stability at the expense of human rights, basic freedoms, 
and democracy, it requires a test. The situation facing Iraq’s 
Assyrians provides such a test, and the U.S. Government is failing. 
The Bush administration’s approach to [the Middle East] has 
been its most vivid departure from prior policy. But our 
approach is, in reality, an extension of traditional tenets—
incorporating human rights and promotion of democratic 
development into a policy meant to further our national 
interest. What is exceptional is that the Middle East was 
treated as an exception for so many decades. U.S. policy 
there focused almost exclusively on stability. There was little 
dialogue, certainly not publicly, about the need for 
democratic change.58
This strategy should also be understood in the context of 
America’s strategy for the War on Terror. The National Military 
Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism is the primary document 
articulating America’s national security interest and the prosecution 
of the war effort.59 That document indicates that the primary threat to 
 56. See Roderick, supra note 15. 
 57. See ISDP, VOTING WITH THEIR FEET, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that “the 
vast majority of IDPs in the Nineveh Plain and surrounding areas are actually 
themselves returnees, their parents or grand-parents being victims of Arabization 
programs driving them out of the area”). 
 58. Rice, Rethinking the National Interest, supra note 7, at 12-13. 
 59. See Linda Robinson, Plan of Attack: The Pentagon Has a Secret New 
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America’s national security is extremism. Extremists “(1) oppose—
in principle and in practice—the right of people to choose how to 
live and how to organize their societies and (2) support the murder of 
ordinary people to advance extremist ideological purposes. 
‘Moderates’ . . . refer to those individuals who do not support the 
extremists.”60
Assyrians and Iraq’s other minorities, such as Shabaks, Yezidis, 
and Turkmen, are Iraq’s best sources for directly leveraging forces of 
moderation in the face of extremism and the extremist threat. Indeed, 
the very deliberate targeting of these populations is because they are 
the moderates. This is borne out statistically in the refugee numbers. 
As stated above, despite being approximately five to seven percent of 
the population of Iraq, they represent upwards of twenty percent of 
the refugee population, as a result of their moderation. 
Secretary Rice’s assertion that human rights and democratic 
development are real goals for U.S. policies in the Middle East and 
Iraq, along with the identification of “extremism” as the primary 
threat to U.S. national security by the Joint Chiefs, provide a robust 
guide to approach the case of minorities generally, and the case of 
Assyrian Christians specifically. The major problem has been the 
absence of an approach and wavering on a willingness to fully 
acknowledge the problem. Therefore, in Iraq and particularly the 
Kurdistan region of Iraq, American policy has not changed but has 
remained markedly similar to previous decades. The emphasis on the 
measure of stability is preventing recognition of the minorities’ crisis 
and reduces U.S. willingness to confront the KRG for its dictatorial, 
prejudicial policies towards minorities. This in turn is preventing 
U.S. Government officials who recognize the problem from actually 
dealing with it. 
Strategy For Taking on Terrorists—and Taking Them Down, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., July 24, 2005, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/ 
050801/1terror.htm (reporting that despite the little fanfare that accompanied the 
release of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s plan, it is now the most comprehensive and 
significant articulation of U.S. military strategy for the War on Terror). 
 60. GENERAL PETER PACE, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 3 (2006), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA443609. 
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A. EQUAL U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTENTION: A POLICY FOR 
IGNORING UNEQUAL ASSYRIAN SUFFERING 
Responding to Congressional concerns about defenseless 
minorities, the Department of State does not want to “exacerbate 
tensions between Iraq’s various communities.”61 It is impossible to 
see how much worse the situation of Assyrians could be exacerbated. 
The U.S. liberation of Iraq mobilized latent societal animosity of 
both Arab Muslims (Sunni and Shi’a) and Kurdish ethno-centric 
nationalism against the Assyrians. These two sources of pressure are 
driving Assyrians out of Iraq. Inaction at this point is now becoming 
complicity, as violence and vulnerability feed one another in a 
vicious spiral for Assyrians. 
The U.S. Government consistently maintains that it does not target 
ethnic and religious minorities for policy attention—either in terms 
of reconstruction, development, or security.62 This is a wholly 
understandable standard policy. However, it defies understanding 
when a group is disproportionately, deliberately targeted and 
suffering with no change in course by the U.S. Government. It is 
impossible to conceive how successful ethno-religious cleansing 
must be for the U.S. Government to accept that a minorities’ crisis 
exists. The U.S. Government is effectively saying it cannot help 
these people to reduce their disproportionate level of suffering 
because policy does not allow it to acknowledge the existence of 
disproportionate Assyrian Christian suffering. 
Acknowledging and confronting the ethno-religious cleansing of 
Iraq’s Christian Assyrians is not about giving preference to one 
group. It is about dealing with a real situation before it is too late. 
 61. U.S. Department of State, Report on United States Assistance to the 
Ninawa Plains in Iraq 1 (Nov. 13, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ninawa 
Plains Spending Report]. The House Committee on Appropriations required the 
State Department to report “on the ethnic and geographic distribution of U.S. 
assistance programs and specifically [to] report on all U.S. assistance reaching the 
Nineveh Plain region.” H.R. REP. NO. 110-60, at 200-01 (2007) (expressing 
concern that U.S. funding was “not reaching all segments of the Iraq population, 
particularly minority populations”). 
 62. E.g., IRAQ RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 3, § IV (stating the 
U.S. policy in Iraq regarding assistance to minority groups is to “not specifically 
target any one ethnic or religious group for assistance”). 
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The State Department report affirms the dire crisis facing Christian 
Assyrians. On the overall situation, it states, “[t]heir security and 
economic status have suffered dramatically in recent years as their 
traditional relationship with the Muslim community has deteriorated; 
many have sought to escape from central Iraq out of genuine fear of 
attacks, kidnappings, and assassinations.”63 Specifically, with regards 
to the governorate of Ninawa and the Nineveh Plain, “the Christian 
minority faces considerable hardship. Some factions are under-
represented politically; some suffer from uneven resource transfers 
from the [KRG] and the Ministry of Finance; and some experience 
human rights abuses.”64 The KRG controls the provincial council of 
Ninawa and is accountable for this situation outlined by the 
Department of State. However, in 2007 “[t]here were numerous 
reports of Kurdish authorities discriminating against minorities in the 
North . . . . [A]uthorities denied services to some villages, arrested 
minorities without due process and took them to undisclosed 
locations for detention, and pressured minority schools to teach in 
the Kurdish language.”65 Expanding on KRG-led discrimination 
against minorities, “[m]embers of [religious minorities] living in 
areas north of Mosul, such as Yazidis and Christians, asserted that 
the KRG encroached on their property and illegally built Kurdish 
settlements on the confiscated land.”66
Despite a generally secular central government that “respected the 
right of individuals to worship according to thought, conscience, and 
belief, private conservative and radical Islamic elements continued to 
exert tremendous pressure on other groups to conform to extremist 
interpretations of Islam’s precepts.”67 Moreover, “[m]embers of the 
Christian community indicated that they were targeted throughout 
the year, particularly by Sunni-affiliated terrorists.”68 Members of 
religious minorities fled from violence in other regions of Iraq to the 
Kurdish region “[d]espite credible reports of KRG discrimination 
 63. Ninawa Plains Spending Report, supra note 61, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, IRAQ: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES – 2007 sec. 5 
(2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100596.htm. 
 66. Id. sec. 2.c. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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against religious minorities.”69 This finding confirms the desire of 
those displaced from their lands to return home in the face of KRG 
authoritarianism and prejudicial treatment. 
B. INEXPLICABLE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite the obvious existence of a crisis, the main finding and 
recommendation of the State Department’s spending report 
concludes that the Christian minority “compares favorably not only 
to other minorities (the Yezidis and Shabak) but also to the Arab 
majority. Thus, on the basis of relative need, it would be 
inappropriate to single out this group for special attention.”70 This 
finding simply does not reconcile with anything indicated by the 
State Department. Assyrians are voting with their feet and fleeing 
their home of close to seven millenia before the world’s eyes, in a 
crisis that 60 Minutes and an array of other major media sources are 
documenting.71 U.S. officials, however, refuse to acknowledge the 
results of that vote. The policy recommendation is mutually 
exclusive of the background information provided by the State 
Department on the hardships and targeting of Assyrians. So what 
does the State Department response truly mean for Washington’s 
decision-makers? If the policy is to do nothing, it would mean that 
U.S. policy has not changed. The policy is consistent with past 
approaches to Middle East diplomacy, where the perceived stability 
of the governments in Baghdad and in the Kurdistan region is 
allowed to trump progress in democratic development and violations 
of human, social, and cultural rights of minorities; in this case, 
stability resulting from authoritarianism and the persecution of 
minorities overrides the Assyrians’ fundamental right to exist in their 
homeland. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Ninawa Plains Spending Report, supra note 61, at 2-3. 
 71. See 60 Minutes: Vicar: Dire Times for Iraq’s Christians (CBS television 
broadcast Dec. 2, 2007), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/ 
29/60minutes/main3553612.shtml (documenting the destruction of Christian 
churches in Iraq and the violence faced by Iraqi Christians); see also Andrew E. 
Kramer, For Iraqi Christians, Money Bought Survival, but at What Cost?, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2008, at A1 (describing the kidnapping and murder of Archbishop 
Paulos Faraj Rahho and the common practice of making Iraqi Christians pay 
protection money to insurgent forces). 
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Secretary Rice asserts, “[t]o state . . . that we must promote either 
our security interests or our democratic ideals is to present a false 
choice. . . . [I]n the long term, our security is best assured by the 
success of our ideals: freedom, human rights, open markets, 
democracy, and the rule of law.”72 The State Department’s inability 
to reconcile its policies with its own acknowledgment that the 
Assyrian Christian community is suffering particular forms of 
targeting exposes the need for a dramatic change in direction. The 
need for a determined policy to save Iraq’s most vulnerable 
minorities is a vital part of lending credence and legitimacy to U.S. 
ideals and, by extension, its policy in Iraq and the Middle East. 
ISDP refers to this State Department trend to dismiss the need for 
action by ignoring or minimizing the disproportionate targeting of 
minorities as “The Myth of Equality in Victimization.”73 It is a tragic 
reaction by officials who acknowledge the crisis but also indicate 
that until directed, there is no particular policy for saving Iraq’s 
minorities or even making this crisis a priority. The myth is 
reinforced with the additional assertion that, “[l]ike many in Iraq, 
Iraq’s Christian communities face severe hardships; however, on the 
basis of relative need, their circumstances would not justify a 
significant change in resource allocation.”74 In fact, these responses 
ring the loudest alarm about the need to define a policy. When a 
State Department report on the situation says the U.S. Government 
should not change course while the Assyrians undergo total 
dislocation, it is clearly a reflection of the need for decision-makers 
to intervene urgently. The State Department should urgently be 
provided with the direction and prioritization they require to assist in 
developing a policy.75
 72. Rice, Rethinking the National Interest, supra note 7, at 14. 
 73. See IRAQ SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY PROJECT, THE “MYTH OF EQUALITY 
IN VICTIMIZATION”: THE ROOTS OF US GOVERNMENT INACTION AS ETHNO-
RELIGIOUS CLEANSING CONTINUES (2008), http://www.assyriacouncil.eu/ 
resources/The+Myth+of+Equality+in+Victimization.pdf. 
 74. Ninawa Plains Spending Report, supra note 61, at 4. 
 75. It must be stated that in ISDP’s assessment, the broad spectrum of State 
Department officials are well-meaning and pre-disposed to seek the well-being of 
all Iraqis, without distinction for ethnicity or religion. However, without a policy 
mandate to focus on a clear-cut crisis facing minorities, they are compelled to 
stand reason on its head and put forth policy recommendations that are clearly 
disconnected from reality. 
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The “Myth of Equality in Victimization” perpetuated by the State 
Department and clearly articulated in its response to Congress’s call 
for an accounting of the situation reflects a confluence of various 
realities in facing the Assyrian crisis in Iraq. First, it reflects the 
absence of a specific, focused policy to protect Iraq’s defenseless 
minorities and ensure they are not eradicated from Iraq. Second, it 
demonstrates that the State Department has little to no direction on 
this matter. 
This “myth” is reinforced in the Department of State’s assertion 
that, “[t]he environment is fragile, and directing additional resources 
that are perceived to benefit a particular group could both heighten 
tensions and undermine the [U.S. Government] policy of fostering a 
tolerant, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and non-sectarian society.”76 
Ambassador Crocker has added, “[t]he best way to provide physical 
and economic security for vulnerable Iraqis is to help build a 
democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq with a security force that 
provides protection for all of Iraq’s citizens.”77 By perpetuating this 
myth, it is then possible to say that nothing should be done, thereby 
completely disregarding the reality that Assyrians and other similar 
minorities cannot withstand the deliberate targeting of their people, 
and level of flight, until such time as widespread stability and peace 
is achieved in Iraq. 
The core basis of a policy for Iraq’s real minorities must proceed 
on the understanding that they cannot survive until such time as the 
U.S. and Iraqi Governments bring stability and peace to all of Iraq. 
This is not a matter of singling them out, but a matter of unavoidable 
fact that the violence they are facing today is driving them out of the 
country. 
The KRG’s effort to remove the Nineveh Plain formal local police 
force this August, followed by the effective stripping away of 
minority representation in governorate elections in September, and 
finally the ethno-religious cleansing of Assyrians from Mosul in 
October exposes the total fallacy in believing the relative success of 
President George W. Bush’s ‘Surge’ would also benefit minorities. 
 76. Ninawa Plains Spending Report, supra note 61, at 3. 
 77. Question for the Record Submitted to Ambassador Ryan Crocker by 
Senator Joseph Biden, Question 13 (Sept. 11, 2007) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Crocker Questions and Answers]. 
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At a time when Iraq is doing better than it has in years, minorities are 
seeing a renewed push to drive them out of their last area of 
concentration in Ninawa Governorate. 
The United States must decide if having inherently moderate 
populations that make Iraq truly multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian is 
in its strategic interest in the long term. 
C. THE INTERVENTION AND EXAMPLE OF U.S. LAWMAKERS 
The House Appropriations Committee has developed two pieces 
of legislation as a result of concern for Iraq’s most vulnerable 
minorities. The first required the Secretary of State to report on all 
spending for ethnic and religious minorities and U.S. Government 
spending in the Nineveh Plain specifically—referenced extensively 
above. The second piece of legislation broke through the 
administrative arm of the government’s informal barrier to 
recognizing this crisis by requiring $10 million for religious minority 
IDPs in the Nineveh Plain. Representative Mark Kirk (R-IL) made 
this proposal, and it passed unanimously in light of congressional 
concern.78
The State Department reports and other responses by U.S. 
Government officials cited in this essay allow us to recognize that a 
“Myth of Equality in Victimization” exists. However, the $10 
million, while yet to be rolled out, is already being seen as a step 
towards greater opening-up of U.S. policy to the crisis due to the 
courage of a few lawmakers. In March 2008, the Appropriations 
Sub-Committee on State and Foreign Operations proposed an 
additional $30 million to address the plight of minorities in the 
Nineveh Plain. 
 78. See Roderick, supra note 15 (crediting Representative Kirk for shepherding 
the amendment through the U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on State and 
Foreign Operations); see also Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-161, 121 Stat. 1844; H.R. REP. NO. 110-197, at 72 (2007), as reprinted in 
2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 661 (accompanying H.R. 2764 and summarizing the 
Committee’s “concern[] about the plight of religious minorities in Iraq and 
inten[tion] that from within the unobligated amounts provided in previous years 
under the heading ‘Economic Support Fund’ for Iraq, not less than $10,000,000 
should be provided to assist religious minorities in the Nineveh Plain region of 
Iraq”). 
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On May 22, 2007, Representative Diane Watson (D-CA) 
confronted the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
regarding minorities and the Nineveh Plain, stating: 
It is my understanding that since late 2005, no notable 
reconstruction or redevelopment project has been undertaken 
in these plains, and it has been ignored probably 
developmentally in a manner that can only be compared to 
apartheid like de-development of an ethnic community. As a 
result, no aid reaching this area and relative to other areas, 
and these IDPs are choosing to flee the country entirely. So 
the Christians, they are de-Christianizing this area in Iraq.79
Representatives Frank Wolf and Anna Eshoo jointly established 
the Religious Minorities in the Middle East Caucus earlier this 
year.80 The Caucus brought together many other members of 
Congress alarmed by the plight of religious minorities in Iraq to 
focus on the situation facing Iraq’s Christians. 
Congressional intervention and action in the area of security for 
minorities is also critical. During a congressional hearing on April 
10, 2008, Congressman Kirk presented Ambassador Ryan Crocker a 
detailed policing plan for the minorities of the Nineveh Plain as per a 
Government of Iraq order which the KRG was blocking. Kirk stated, 
“I don’t think we have detailed plans for any other set of villages in 
Iraq—but we certainly have it for these villages.” Rep. Kirk added 
that he would like to have the police force created and funded 
quickly.81
During the high-profile September 11, 2007 hearings with General 
David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Senator Joseph R. 
Biden Jr. (D-DE) asked Ambassador Crocker a critical question 
about the constitutional basis for establishing some type of federal 
 79. Iraq: Is Reconstruction Failing? Hearing before the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 110th Cong. 26 (2007) (question from Rep. 
Diane Watson to SIGIR Head Stuart Bowen). 
 80. See All Things Considered: Caucus Highlights Persecution of Christians in 
Iraq (Nat’l Pub. Radio radio broadcast Apr. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89787382. 
 81. Waleeta Canon, Ambassador Crocker Discusses Assyrian Police Force, 
Refugees on Capitol Hill, ZINDA MAG., Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.zindamagazine. 
com/html/archives/2008/04.14.08/index_mon.php. 
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unit under Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution. In response, 
Ambassador Crocker affirmed that “[s]ome Iraqi parliamentarians 
and local politicians in Ninawa have called for an autonomous region 
in Ninawa province, citing Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution. Iraqi 
citizens can pursue the creation of a separate administrative region 
through processes consistent with this article.”82
To summarize Congressional policy focus, in early 2007 Congress 
passed legislation calling for an accounting of the level of U.S. 
reconstruction activity in the Nineveh Plain.83 They promptly passed 
precedent-setting legislation targeting $10 million in humanitarian 
relief for religious minority IDPs in the Nineveh Plain where a 
majority of Assyrians, Shabaks, and Yezidis are found.84 Congress is 
aggressively pursuing the issues of allowing minorities to assume a 
full role in security, particularly at the local level, in order to ensure 
ethno-religious pluralism in Iraq’s security forces but also to guard 
against the intimidation and force used against Assyrians and other 
minorities by insurgents and the KRG’s Peshmerga. Lastly, lines of 
inquiry, such as those between Senator Biden about robust federal 
models, and opportunities for minorities, such as the chance to create 
a unique federal unit in the Nineveh Plain, reflect the possibilities in 
engaging these issues constructively and without reprisal. It is critical 
to identify the precedents and policy dialogue established by the 
Congress and begin putting full U.S. Government support behind it. 
Courageous efforts by various members of each house to take 
concerted action must be seen in light of the Congress’s political will 
and concern for Iraq’s minorities. 
V. SOLUTIONS 
In many respects, Congress has shown the solution, first by 
acknowledging the minorities’ crisis. In terms of the Assyrians, 
members of Congress are referring to this as the “de-
Christianization” of Iraq.85 Recognizing the crisis allows the U.S. 
 82. Crocker Questions and Answers, supra note 77, Question 13. 
 83. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 
1844. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Ashtar Analeed Marcus, U.S. House Approves $10M for the 
Nineveh Plains in Iraq, ZINDA MAG., June 26, 2007, http://www.house.gov/ 
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Government to pursue a strategy to save Iraq’s minorities and 
thereby also realize U.S. national security interests and move 
towards what Secretary Rice terms “American Realism for a New 
World.”86 The three prongs of such a strategy are: 
reconstruction/humanitarian assistance; security; and governance 
(particularly federalism, land rights, and elections). 
A. DEFINING AN ENDURING SOLUTION 
Recognition of a minorities’ crisis is an essential step towards 
placing this issue firmly within the framework of America’s national 
security and the fight against extremism. The minorities’ crisis 
represents the loss of moderates in the face of targeting by 
extremists. On one of the critical fronts of the war on terror—Iraq—
America is rapidly losing vital allies and sources for leveraging 
moderation and democratization by allowing Iraq’s real minorities to 
be ethno-religiously cleansed at worst, or fully marginalized and 
politically silenced at best. At the highest levels of the U.S. 
Government, explicit recognition of this crisis must be forthcoming 
in order to ensure the required departmental and agency action to 
remedy the situation. Subsequently, the definition of a robust policy 
can be fully detailed. However, the three above-mentioned prongs of 
any such policy are generally addressed here. 
Together, the three prongs of the policy constitute the basic 
framework for a ‘Minorities Surge.’ The serious setbacks to 
minorities just when the ‘Surge’ is producing positive results for Iraq 
as a whole necessitates an appropriately framed targeted policy to 
save Iraq’s defenseless minorities. 
1. Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
At the present moment the area of the Nineveh Plain is suffering 
neglect in terms of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction 
efforts. There is work being done, but this work is nowhere near the 
level of assistance necessary for making a significant impact. The 
list/hearing/il10_kirk/US_House_Approves_10M_for_Nineveh_Plains.html 
(quoting U.S. Representative Mark Kirk as saying that the Congressional funding 
is an attempt to prevent the de-Christianization of Iraq). 
 86. Rice, Rethinking the National Interest, supra note 7, at 2. 
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area was underdeveloped through the neglect of previous regimes 
and at the fall of Saddam Hussein, required substantial assistance for 
its existing population. The massive influx of IDPs has placed the 
area under extraordinary strain (as State Department reporting 
acknowledges). ISDP’s interviews with refugees in Jordan, Syria, 
and Lebanon indicate that a great majority of refugees were first 
IDPs mainly to the north and the Nineveh Plain in particular. The 
hopelessness and despair of the area compelled them to abandon 
Iraq, thus fueling a disproportionate increase in the number of 
Assyrians in the refugee population. 
With over one in three Assyrian Christians already cleansed from 
Iraq, it is not enough to approach reconstruction and development as 
a means to prevent further minority flight. Instead, targeted 
assistance to areas such as the Nineveh Plain must be designed with 
the goal of drawing refugees back to their homeland. That is the only 
benchmark that can truly serve to prevent the loss of the indigenous 
Assyrian, Yezidis, and Shabak minorities and signal to the 
vulnerable Turkmen minority that it too has a future in Iraq. 
Food item and non-food item humanitarian assistance will assist 
people to remain in areas such as the Nineveh Plain for the short and 
medium term. If basic needs can be met, it will allow a great many to 
try to cope with Islamist targeting and authoritarian pressures from 
the KRG and tolerate the conditions of relative, albeit decreased, 
deprivation. 
Humanitarian assistance must be delivered in conjunction with 
identifiable, tangible reconstruction and development. The U.S. 
Government is indicating that it has spent enough money on Iraq’s 
reconstruction and that the “bricks and mortar” stage of U.S. aid is at 
an end.87 Given the neglect of the Nineveh Plain, the level of IDP 
absorption, and the overall political context of the Nineveh Plain for 
saving minorities, an exception to U.S. policy and a plan for 
comprehensive reconstruction in the Nineveh Plain are necessary. 
 87. See JAMES F. JEFFREY, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SEC’Y AND COORDINATOR 
FOR IRAQ, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ IN THE FY 2006 
SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET AND FY 2007 BUDGET REQUEST (2006), 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2006/62263.htm (discussing the shift away from 
mortar and steel and brick type reconstructions and towards capacity 
development). 
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In providing humanitarian assistance, the priority should be on 
housing, schools, health care facilities, potable water, electrification, 
and roads. Additionally, support for agricultural development will 
capitalize on the natural advantage the area has in agriculture. The 
Nineveh Plain was the breadbasket of the ancient Assyrian empire 
and remains to this day a fertile land capable of supporting an array 
of agricultural development endeavors. Lastly, the Nineveh Plain is 
in need of a higher education institution, a university. Minorities, 
particularly Assyrian Christians, place a significant premium on 
higher education. They represent a number of the educated and 
professional class in Iraq far exceeding their percentage of the 
population. Since at least 2005, Mosul University (the second largest 
in Iraq) has been inaccessible to thousands of students from minority 
peoples due to targeting by extremists.88 Establishing a university in 
the Nineveh Plain will ensure that these thousands of students and 
their families are not compelled to flee Iraq. Concurrently, such a 
project will create jobs immediately while also establishing the basis 
for economic growth in areas of small- and medium-sized businesses 
servicing the university itself and its student population. 
2. Security 
Fully executing the Government of Iraq’s order for the creation of 
a 711 member local police force in the Nineveh Plain must be the 
primary goal as a first step towards establishing a more viable 
security structure in the region. In so doing, it would affirm the 
jurisdiction of the central government versus the KRG, the latter of 
which is the political obstacle to this force, encroaching on matters of 
security outside of its jurisdiction. Additionally, it would provide real 
progress in realizing U.S. strategic interests in terms of standing up 
formal, local police forces as a means of allowing U.S. forces to 
stand down. 
After succeeding in removing KRG/KDP obstacles to the 
formation of the full force of 711 (it is at present frozen at 269 
officers), the next steps can be taken towards expanding the local 
police force to meet the optimal police to population ratios. 
 88. See Bandow, supra note 16 (reporting that “Christian students have been 
beaten, shot, and threatened with expulsion”). 
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Meaningful levels of security will also require ensuring progress by 
the U.S. Government in training and standing up special forces or 
SWAT units in the Nineveh Plain, who are the only true assurance of 
engaging with insurgents and extremists. 
It is worth noting that immediate progress is needed on this issue 
as it will also serve the goal of providing free and fair elections.89 If 
Peshmerga are allowed to remain in the Nineveh Plain during the 
elections, a repeat of the widespread disenfranchisement and 
electoral fraud is certain, as will be discussed below. 
3. Governance 
The contentiousness surrounding issues of federalism and 
autonomy in Iraq certainly requires the United States to tread 
carefully in terms of policy development and pronouncements. The 
reaction in Iraq to the Biden-Gelb Plan,90 which elicited sharp rebuke 
and protest and drove mistrust among Iraqis, cannot be ignored.91 
However, federalism is the single most powerful constitutional tool 
available for all stakeholders (Iraqi and American) in ensuring a 
pluralistic, democratic Iraq. To that end, the constitution of Iraq 
provides for an exceptional federal arrangement for ethno-religious 
minorities. Iraq as a federation is comprised of regions, governorates, 
a decentralized capital, and local administrations, “[the] last of which 
is concerned not with local governments but protection for 
minorities.”92
 89. See Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed, Worth a Thousand Words, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 23, 2004, at A25 (arguing that without increased peace and security, the 
chances of a free and fair election in Iraq are slim). 
 90. See Joseph R. Biden Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed, Unity Through 
Autonomy in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at A2 (advocating an approach 
modeled after the reconstruction of Bosnia, that would divide Iraq into three 
autonomous regions and strengthen the rights of women and ethnic minorities). 
The discussion over Ethnosectarian division plans, such as the Biden-Gelb plan, 
has spurred much controversy as to how much federalism is appropriate in Iraq. 
See, e.g., Paul R. Williams & Matthew T. Simpson, Rethinking the Political 
Future: An Alternative to the Ethno-Sectarian Division of Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 191 (2008). 
 91. See Paul Reynolds, Search for Least-Worst Option in Iraq, BBC NEWS, 
Oct. 24, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6062688.stm (opposing any 
partitioning of Iraq by Sunni Iraqis and articulating the opinion of President Jalal 
Talabani that there is no possibility of accepting such a policy). 
 92. Yash Ghai & Jill Cottrell, A Review of the Constitution of Iraq 28 (Univ. of 
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Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution guarantees “the 
administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of the 
various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and 
all other constituents, and this shall be regulated by law.”93 As 
confirmed in the response by Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Senator 
Biden, this Article does provide the chance to create some type of 
unique federal unit, thereby providing some measure of autonomy 
within a strong federation.94
Even though the Article 125 language existed in the Transitional 
Administrative Law95 and was adopted in the Constitution before the 
scope of the minorities’ crisis became fully evident, it is today 
regarded as the primary policy for ensuring that Iraq’s Assyrian, 
Shabak, Yezidis and Turkmen populations are not wiped out. 
However, open discussions of autonomy in Iraq are seen as a process 
for partitioning the country. Full comprehension of its technical use 
as a governance concept is not recognized. To that end, a Nineveh 
Plain Administrative Unit (NPAU) should be created under the 
authority provided by Article 125. This policy should be understood 
for its potential to provide the necessary protection for minorities 
without emphasizing the “autonomy” language in which it fits. 
If such a federal unit were established, it would ensure that at least 
one of Iraq’s federal units is thoroughly heterogeneous ethnically and 
religiously, with its main population made up of Assyrians, Shabaks, 
and Yezidis, where no group overwhelms the others. Pursuing the 
NPAU policy through the operationalization of the “Article 125 
Solution” will begin a movement that takes Iraq away from the 
destructive and politically debilitating process of pitting three large 
stakeholders (Shi’a Arab south, Sunni Arab center, and Sunni Kurd 
Wis. Law Sch. Global Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/arotcoi.pdf. 
 93. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ art. 125 (2006), available at 
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf. 
 94. See Crocker Questions and Answers, supra note 77, Question 13. 
 95. E.g., Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional 
Period, arts. 52-53 (2004), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ 
iraq/tal.htm (describing the Iraq governmental structure as a federal system 
designed to encourage the exercise of local authority, preventing the concentration 
of power that allowed decades of tyranny under the previous regime and 
guaranteeing the “administrative, cultural, and political rights of the Turcomans, 
ChaldoAssyrians, and all other citizens”). 
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north) in a zero-sum calculation where potential secession provides 
an effective veto in political bargaining, to one where no one unit can 
dominate so absolutely. The creation of Local Administrations, 
starting with the NPAU (but certainly creating other such federal 
units where necessary), will signal the movement towards the actual 
intention and function of federal arrangements by negating zero-sum 
calculations centered on ethnic and sectarian differences. It will 
instead emphasize heterogeneity, pluralism, and mutually beneficial 
political compromises. 
The upcoming provincial government elections will also be a 
critical test for how Assyrians and other defenseless ethno-religious 
minorities see their future in Iraq. In the January and December 
elections, the Nineveh Plain was widely disenfranchised and endured 
extensive electoral fraud perpetrated by the KRG.96 A priority must 
be made to ensure free and fair elections in the Nineveh Plain. The 
primary step towards this goal is ensuring that security is in the 
hands of the locals by establishing formal local policing. At present, 
Peshmerga forces control the security in the Nineveh Plain, allowing 
the KDP/KRG to deny the minorities of the Nineveh Plain a chance 
to express their will electorally. Prioritizing the Nineveh Plain for 
international observers and spending a significant portion of funding 
for minorities in Ninawa and the Nineveh Plain on capacitating the 
minority parties and groups should compliment the basic security 
requirements for free and fair elections. 
Finally land return is of great significance for political progress, as 
well as the immediate economic, social, and cultural rights benefits. 
While there are of course widespread, generalized problems with 
land return and establishing land rights, those which require 
immediate attention are those in which the KDP/KRG aided in the 
land theft. Cases such as Dere/Coumaneh/Maristek, Bebade, Kori 
Gavana, Chamal Rebethke, Chaqala Khtatha, and Sarsink are only a 
sample of such cases.97 U.S. intervention in these cases will provide 
a robust sample and set the precedents needed in working with the 
 96. See Porter, Voting Shenanigans, supra note 32 (reporting the questionable 
actions and occurrences surrounding the 2005 elections). 
 97. See Michael Youash, Testimony before U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, Hearing: Threats to Iraq’s Communities of Antiquity, July 25, 
2007, http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1378 
&Itemid=1. 
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KRG to change its behavior on an issue integral to saving ethno-
religious minorities. 
CONCLUSION 
While ethno-religious minorities such as Iraq’s indigenous 
Assyrian Christians face an existential threat, the United States is 
making history in minority rights with the election of the first ever 
African-American president. Hundreds of years of struggle and work 
brought the United States to such a point in its history. The United 
States has much to offer in assisting Iraq not to make the same errors. 
Unfortunately, this is not happening. The policy recommendations of 
the Department of State indicate the United States’ inability to fully 
admit the problem and its readiness to assert that nothing should be 
done. This must change. If the National Military Strategic Plan for 
the War on Terrorism is to be more than just words on paper, then 
the minorities’ crisis is about supporting moderates in the face of 
extremists for the betterment of all, on the front line of that vital 
struggle. If the goal is a democratic Iraq, pluralism and a robust 
federal system where minorities can meaningfully participate are 
sure to enhance the chances of establishing a democracy that is 
sustainable. 
If Americans and the international community are to believe 
Secretary Rice’s assertion that America is moving towards a new 
approach in the Middle East that genuinely places a premium on 
democratic values and norms, and not simply on stability at the 
expense of human rights and liberties, then the test case is with the 
Assyrians, Shabaks, Yezidis, Turkmen and other defenseless 
minorities in Iraq today. The presence of over 140,000 troops and an 
entire U.S. military and civilian infrastructure to support their 
mission makes Iraq the single greatest measure of the veracity of the 
Secretary of State’s promise. Nowhere else is the United States better 
situated to live up to the commitments made on national security and 
the struggle for freedom and dignity for all. 
The legislative and political setbacks to minorities from August 
2008 to the present, combined with the concerted effort to kill 
Christian Assyrians in Mosul, internally-displacing over 3,000 
families in a matter of days, reflects the emptiness of the policy to 
improve minorities’ suffering by making Iraq a safer place. It also 
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exposes the fact that Assyrians are deliberately targeted all these 
years since the fall of Saddam Hussein. For this reason, the 
development of a policy framed as a ‘Minorities Surge’ is essential. 
If this Article is critical, the hope is it at least be seen as 
constructive. Policy failures and shortcomings are easier to identify 
than to accept. Coping with them and rising to the challenges 
outlined in this piece will not be easy. Secretary Rice herself, writing 
on the “New Realism” that does not forgo human rights and 
democracy, states that “[o]ur current course is certainly difficult, but 
let us not romanticize the old bargains of the Middle East—for they 
yielded neither justice nor stability.”98 The Iraqi Government is 
apathetic at best but more likely complicit in the cleansing of 
Christians by extremists in major urban centers. The KRG in Irbil is 
persecuting and treating Assyrians prejudicially. It is certainly easier 
to acknowledge these governments for the stability they are offering. 
However, if this stability occurs with ethno-religiously cleansing 
Assyrians and then others thereafter, the United States will have 
failed these minority allies in Iraq, failed to secure a part of its 
national security interests, and will have ultimately failed itself. 
 98. Rice, Rethinking the National Interest, supra note 7, at 13. 
